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Abstract – By analysing the diffusive dynamics of epidemics and of distress in complex networks,
we study the effect of the assortativity on the robustness of the networks. We first determine by
spectral analysis the thresholds above which epidemics/failures can spread; we then calculate the
slowest diffusional times. Our results shows that disassortative networks exhibit a higher epidemi-
ological threshold and are therefore easier to immunize, while in assortative networks there is a
longer time for intervention before epidemic/failure spreads. Moreover, we study by computer sim-
ulations the sandpile cascade model, a diffusive model of distress propagation (financial contagion).
We show that, while assortative networks are more prone to the propagation of epidemic/failures,
degree-targeted immunization policies increases their resilience to systemic risk.
Introduction. – The heterogeneity in the distribu-
tion of contacts in a population is one of the key factors
affecting the propagation of diseases [1]. For example, a
large variance of the degree (the number of a node neigh-
bours) distribution is a typical feature of complex net-
works [2,3] that plays a role in determining the dynamical
process defined on the networks itself [4]. It has been
shown [5, 6] that in the presence of a large heterogene-
ity, the value of epidemic threshold tends to vanish in the
limit of infinitely large network leading therefore to a finite
probability of pandemic outbreak [7,8]. Such results have
been obtained for specific models of diffusion processes as
SIR and SIS on complex networks [1,6,9]. Similar consid-
erations apply to the analysis of any kind of propagation,
as that of financial distress, even if in the latter case the
channels of propagation are different from the epidemio-
logical ones. Most of the derivation of the analytical re-
sults are based on mean field hypothesis and on analysis
of the spectral properties of suitable matrices associated
with the network [6, 10–12] (we describe that matrices in
detail in the following). This kind of studies is particular
useful in order to define suitable procedures to stop the
propagation of an epidemic [13–15].
In comparison to the humongous efforts that have been
devoted to understand the role of the distribution of con-
tacts in the networks, less attention has been paid to the
assortativity (or vertex-vertex degree correlation) of the
networks. Actually, most if not all real networks have non-
trivial values of this vertex-vertex correlation. In partic-
ular, some networks exhibit “assortative mixing” on their
degrees, i.e. high-degree vertices tend to be attached to
high-degree vertices; other networks show ”disassortative
mixing”, i.e. high-degree vertices tend to be attached to
small-degree vertices. The network’s degree–degree cor-
relation can be summarized by a single scalar quantity r
called the assortativity coefficient [16]. This quantity as-
sumes the value r = 0 for degree-uncorrelated networks, is
r > 0 for assortative networks and r < 0 for disassortative
ones. Assortative correlations are typically observed in
social networks [16], while disassortative connections are
mainly found in technological and biological networks [17].
We produce and analyse different networks with the
same degree sequence but different assortativity. We first
focus on spectral analysis, a very general approach to de-
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termine the diffusion dynamics on a complex network by
matrix analysis; in particular, we derive the difference in
epidemics propagation for networks with different assor-
tativity properties. We then focus on a classical model of
distress propagation, the BTW sandpile [18]; using com-
puter simulations, we study the effectiveness of targeted
immunization policies with respect to the assortativity of
the underlying network.
Methods. – Formally, a network (or a graph) is de-
fined as a pair G = (V,E) where V is the set of NV nodes
and E is the set of NE links; each link joins two nodes.
To each graph G we associate its adjacency matrix A, de-
fined as Aij = 1 if nodes i,j are connected, Aij = 0 other-
wise. We consider networks that are simple (no self loops,
i.e. Aii = 0) and undirected (Aij = Aji). The degree of
node i is the number of its neighbours and is defined as
ki =
∑
j Aij . The Laplacian matrix of a network is defined
as L ≡ K −A, where K is the diagonal matrix of degrees
Kij = kiδij . The Laplacian matrix is the analogous of the
Laplacian operator and describes the diffusion of random
walkers on the network.
The assortative coefficient r is the degree-degree Pear-
son correlation coefficient of two vertices connected by
an edge r = [〈kq〉 − 〈(1/2)(k + q)〉2]/[〈(1/2)(k2 + q2)〉 −
〈(1/2)(k+ q)〉2] where k, q are the degrees of two adjacent
vertices; averages 〈. . .〉 are over the edges. In order to
sample the space of possible networks with respect to the
assortativity, we use the procedure of ref. [19].
We sample the statistical ensemble of graphs {G} with
probability measure µ(G) ∝ e−H(G) induced by the Hamil-
tonian H (G) = −J
∑
ij
Aijkikj , where J is the coupling
constant measuring the strength of the interaction.
In order to sample configurations according to µ(G), we
explore the configuration space by link rewiring [20] and
accept a link rewiring with probability e−∆H . Once the
initial network is given, such procedure leaves the initial
degree sequence unchanged. We explore 21 equally spaced
values of J ranging from −10 to 10 producing 100 inde-
pendent configurations for each J . Since H ∝ 〈kikj〉, the
averageH/J sampled in this statistical ensemble decreases
if the assortativity increases and vice-versa (Fig.1). Notice
that the values of the assortativity r with respect to the
parameter J is monotonously increasing (Fig. 1, inset).
Spectral Analysis. – While the sampling procedure
is general, in this paper we focus on initial network con-
figurations obtained by the Baraba´si-Albert preferential
attachment (BA networks) [21]. For each value of J , we
average over 102 networks of 104 nodes each.
We first calculate the maximum eigenvalue Λ1 of the ad-
jacency matrices. The adjacency matrix A dictates which
nodes can be immediately reached by a ”virulent” node
and is hence central in describing not only the propagation
of epidemics but also the propagation of faults/failures
[11]; its maximum eigenvalue Λ1 is related to how fast a
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Fig. 1: Values of the energy per link H/JNE , versus the as-
sortativity coefficient (i.e. degree-degree correlation) r, for all
the 2100 networks of 10000 nodes. In the inset the coefficient
r for the same networks as a function of J .
process can spread in a network.
For the SIS model of infections, Wang and coauthors
have shown that the epidemic threshold τ of a network
is exactly τ = Λ−11 [11]; τ is defined as the critical ratio
among the propagation rate and the recovery rate of a
disease above which epidemics ensue.
We find that Λ−11 decreases with assortativity: in the
range of correlation explored, the most disassortative net-
works show an epidemic threshold about 60% higher than
most assortative ones (Fig.2). Our findings confirm the
idea that avoiding direct connections between hubs (highly
connected nodes) may provide protection against epi-
demics [22].
We then calculate the first non-zero eigenvalue λ2 of
the Laplacian matrices. The Laplacian L describes the
diffusive process ∂tρ = −Lρ on the network. While the
first eigenvalue λ1 = 0 is associated to the stationary dis-
tribution, the first non-zero eigenvalue λ2 is the inverse
timescale of slowest mode of diffusion.
In general, we can think of λ−12 as the longest timescale
after which a perturbation (like the infection of a site)
that spreads diffusively will settle a new state (like an
epidemics) in the network. Therefore, a small value of
λ−12 means that there is less time for intervention before
a network is totally compromised by randomly propagat-
ing failures or epidemics; in this respect most assortative
networks show times up to 80% higher than most disas-
sortative ones (Fig. 3).
The eigenvalues of L govern also the harmonic dynam-
ics of a network: the adimensional vibration equation
in the node displacements x can in fact be written as
∂2t x = −
∑
j
Aij(xi − xj) = −Lx and again the period
of the slowest oscillatory mode is λ−12 . Almendral and
coauthors have shown [23] that in general synchronization
times in complex networks have an almost linear depen-
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Fig. 2: Λ−1
1
versus J . The decrease of Λ−1
1
with J and therefore
with assortativity indicates a lower epidemic threshold; hence
disassortative networks are less prone to epidemic spreading.
dence on λ−12 .
Distress propagation. – Beside epidemiological
models, there are other types of contagion propagation
paradigms that are especially suitable for accounting cas-
cades of financial distress. Avalanche dynamics or domino
effect (as it is frequently indicated in economics) is cur-
rently regarded as an important feature during finan-
cial crises. These phenomena are frequently modelled by
means of a class of cellular automata known as sandpile
models [18] that can mimic financial distress propagation
[24]; financial crisis fluctuations are described, at least
qualitatively, by the avalanches of a sandpile model [25].
Conservation laws provide the connection between sand-
pile models and random-walk (diffusive) models [26].
In sandpiles every vertex has a given capacity to store a
scalar field (originally “sand”). For our purposes, such a
scalar can represent financial distress (debts) or the proba-
bility of a failure. When such a quantity reaches a thresh-
old value, the vertex becomes “bankrupt” and passes its
distress to the neighbours. Similarly to previous studies
[27–29] we set the failure threshold equal to the degree k of
vertex. The simulation time is discrete and at every step
we add a grain of sand (distress) on a randomly drawn
vertex. When the threshold is reached, the vertex topples
and distributes a grain of sand (unit of distress) to every
neighbour. Topplings continue as long as some vertex is
above threshold; a single toppling can therefore produce
an avalanche. The size s of an avalanche is defined as the
number of topplings occurring until there are no more ver-
tices above threshold. When the avalanche stops, we add
new grains until a new avalanche starts and so on. With
respect to the original formulation, here we assume that
a fraction P of the vertices are immunized and that such
vertices can absorb infinite amount of sand (distress); this
is the analogous to say that a vertex is under the cover-
age of a central bank. To each strategy of choosing the
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Fig. 3: λ−1
2
versus J . The increase of λ−1
2
with J and therefore
with assortativity indicates a growth of the longest relaxation
time for diffusion processes on the network. Analogously, both
the slowest vibrational mode and the synchronization time in-
crease with assortativity.
immunized vertices corresponds a policy aimed to limit
avalanche propagation, a feature of particularly relevance
in the case of a financial crisis; it is anyhow important to
use the least number of immunized vertices to minimize
the financial cost.
By using this cellular automaton we determine the ef-
fects of the assortativity on different policies to stop the
propagation of distress; in particular, we consider both a
random and a targeted policy of vertex immunization.
In the random policy we pin PNV randomly chosen ver-
tices; for such a case, assortativity does not play a signif-
icant role and the fraction P of pinned nodes (i.e. nodes
that can absorb any amount of distress) is the only control
parameter.
For small P avalanche sizes are power-law distributed
with an exponent γ = 3/2 [30]; this is the worst scenario,
where avalanches of the size of the system (systemic crisis)
can occur.
The avalanche size frequency takes the functional form
f(s) ∝ s−3/2e−s/ξ; the cutoff ξ is a measure of the largest
possible avalanches and increases with P . From the point
of view of the policy maker, it is crucial to limit the size
ξ of the systemic crises keeping the minimum effort (i.e.
small P ).
In the targeted immunization policy we sort the vertices
according to their degrees and pin the first PNV starting
from the largest hub. Such policy takes into account the
fragility of the hubs in power-law networks [31]. At fixed
P , we find that targeted immunization is always more effi-
cient than the random one; moreover, the effects of the as-
sortativity become evident even for small values of P . On
Figure 4 we present the avalanche size distribution for the
targeted immunization on networks with large (J = 10)
and small (J = −10) assortativity. While the exponent
of the power law remains γ = 3/2 for both immunization
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Fig. 4: Avalanche size frequency distribution for an ensemble of
100 networks of 10000 nodes each; for each network, we immu-
nise (pin) the PNV nodes with largest degrees. In the figure we
compare the most assortative networks with the most disassor-
tative ones. As expected, increasing P mitigates systemic cas-
cades by depressing the probability of the biggest avalanches,
i.e. decreasing the cut-off values ξ. At fixed P , we observe a
clear improvement between the cut-off values ξ for assortative
networks with respect to disassortative ones, i.e. the size of the
largest avalanche is smaller. As an example, immunizing 10%
(P = 0.1) of the banks, assortativity improves the effectiveness
of the policy by factor ∼ 4. Such an effect is monotonous: as
an example, the avalanche frequencies at P = 0.10 for neutral
(r ∼ 0) networks has an intermediate behavior respect to the
assortative and the disassortative cases.
policies, we find that the value of the cutoff ξ strongly de-
pends on the assortativity of the network. In particular,
assortative networks are subject to much smaller systemic
crisis than disassortative ones; therefore, assortative net-
works are easier to immunise.
Conclusions. – In this paper we considered the ef-
fects of the topology on the propagation of diseases or
distress in a network system by means of spectral anal-
ysis and simulations. This problem is often approached
by considering the statistical distribution of the number
of contacts, we instead focused on the two-point degree
correlation.
First, we show that assortativity increases the proba-
bility of a pandemic (low epidemic threshold) while de-
creasing the speed of diffusive exploration (slow diffusive
modes).
Second, we find that in a simple model mimicking fi-
nancial distress propagation, targeted immunization pol-
icy may limit the size of financial crisis; we find that assor-
tativity strongly enhances the effectiveness of such a pol-
icy. These results can be used to devise efficient and fast
actions to protect infrastructural networks of any kind.
We believe that this paper contributes to a better under-
standing of immunization procedures on complex networks
and to a better evaluation of the robustness of a given
system. We find that assortativity can not be regarded
as a topological intrinsic improvement: it enhances time
for intervention and improves the effectiveness of financial
immunization policies, but epidemics/failures are easier
to propagate. Our findings indicate that policy makers in
financial markets need to account carefully for the assor-
tativity of the network to mitigate the spread of economic
crises in financial markets.
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